Financial Regulation and Shadow Banking by Fève, Patrick et al.
 TSE	‐	829
	
	
“Shadow	Banking	and	Financial	Regulation:	
A	Small‐Scale	DSGE	Perspective"		
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Revised‐	August	2018	
Shadow Banking and Financial Regulation:
A Small-Scale DSGE Perspective
Patrick Fèvea∗ Alban Mourab Olivier Pierrardb
a Toulouse School of Economics and University of Toulouse I - Capitole
b Banque Centrale du Luxembourg
August 21, 2018
Abstract
This paper estimates a small-scale DSGE model of the US economy with interacting tradi-
tional and shadow banks. We find that shadow banks amplify the transmission of struc-
tural shocks by helping escape constraints from traditional intermediaries. We show how
this leakage toward shadow entities reduces the ability of macro-prudential policies target-
ing traditional credit to reduce economic volatility. A counterfactual experiment suggests
that a countercyclical capital buffer, if applied only to traditional banks, would have in fact
amplified the boom-bust cycle associated with the financial crisis of 2007-2008. On the other
hand, a broader regulation scheme targeting both traditional and shadow credit would have
helped stabilize the economy.
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1 Introduction
There is now a general agreement that the limited regulation of non-depository financial insti-
tutions, or shadow banks, was a major cause of the subprime mortgage crisis and the ensuing
Great Recession.1 As a result, both academics and policy makers have called for financial reg-
ulation to move toward a more global and macro-prudential direction (see for instance Adrian
and Shin, 2009; Gorton and Metrick, 2010; Hanson et al., 2011; Bernanke, 2013). However, most
macro models with a financial sector feature only traditional banks, so they probably miss
important considerations about macro-prudential regulation. In this paper, we propose and
estimate a small-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with interacting
traditional and shadow banks. We then use the model to evaluate alternative forms of financial
regulation aimed at stabilizing economic and credit cycles.
Our model works as follows. As in Gertler et al. (2016) and Meeks et al. (2017), we start from
a standard real-business-cycles (RBC) model and augment it with a financial sector including
traditional and shadow banks. Both types of banks intermediate credit between saving house-
holds and borrowing non-financial firms. Traditional banks mostly finance through deposits,
but also hold capital to comply with macro-prudential regulation. On the other hand, shadow
banks finance on wholesale markets by issuing asset-backed securities (ABS) against their pool
of loans and completely escape regulation. Because they are easily tradable on financial mar-
kets, ABS are subject to less regulation than standard loans, so that traditional banks have
incentives to substitute loans with ABS in order to increase their leverage. While the general
logic is similar to Gertler et al. and Meeks et al., there is one key difference. In these papers,
shadow banking increases the efficiency of credit intermediation by relaxing financial frictions
associated with the limited pledgeability of assets.2 In contrast, in our framework shadow
banking increases efficiency because of asymmetric regulation since shadow banks do not face
the same regulatory constraints as traditional intermediaries.
In themodel, two structural parameters define the interactions between traditional and shadow
banks: a portfolio cost limiting the ability to substitute traditional loans and ABS, and a bank
capital cost defining how regulation affects the supply of traditional credit. To identify these pa-
rameters, we estimate the model on quarterly US data for the period 1980-2016 using Bayesian
methods and a selection of observables that includes both real (consumption, investment, hours
1Online Appendix I provides more details on the differences between traditional and shadow banks.
2These authors assume that traditional banks may divert loans more easily than ABS, and that shadow banks
divert loans less than traditional banks.
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worked) and financial (the ratio between shadow and total credit, the leverage of traditional
banks, and a lending-deposit spread) variables. Estimation results are plausible — in particu-
lar, the estimates imply a cost of macro-prudential regulation in line with values reported in the
literature — and the model has a reasonable fit. The decomposition of business cycles is fairly
standard for a real model, with the neutral productivity shock playing a leading role. Still, fi-
nancial shocks explain between 30 and 40 percent of the fluctuations in output and investment,
suggesting that the model is able to propagate financial disturbances to the real economy.
The estimated model suggests that shadow banking constitutes an important amplification
mechanism in general equilibrium because it helps escape constraints arising from the tra-
ditional sector. For instance, after a positive technology shock economic activity and credit
expand jointly. Because raising additional capital is slow, the leverage of traditional banks in-
creases and this translates into higher spreads. When credit intermediation can be partly redi-
rected toward the shadow sector, the rise in traditional bank leverage and spreads is smaller,
which stimulates the expansion. Highlighting this amplification effect associated with shadow
banking is our first contribution.
We also study the stabilization properties of different macro-prudential policies in presence of
shadow banks. Our second contribution is to demonstrate how asymmetries between tradi-
tional and shadow intermediaries dampen the ability of regulators to stabilize the economy.
For instance, the model implies that intermediation migrates to the shadow sector after an ex-
ogenous increase in the capital adequacy ratio of traditional banks, which limits the effects of
asymmetric regulation. This property is consistent with Buchak et al. (2017), who find in the
data that shadow banks are more likely to enter markets in which traditional banks face tight
regulation. This regulatory arbitrage also affects the ability of a countercyclical capital buffer
to reduce aggregate fluctuations. Using historical counterfactual simulations, we show that a
countercyclical buffer targeting and applied to traditional loans only would have amplified,
rather than dampened, the boom-bust cycle associated with the financial crisis of 2007-2008 in
the US. On the other hand, a broader regulation scheme targeting both traditional and shadow
credit would have been more successful in stabilizing the economy. Overall, our findings thus
support the recent shift in banking regulation toward a more global approach, as advocated in
the Basel III package.
Our paper belongs to a recent strand of the literature integrating shadow banking in DSGE
models. Above, we have briefly described the modeling approach used in Gertler et al. (2016)
and Meeks et al. (2017), and how our framework differs from their. Our focus is also different:
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Gertler et al. explain how their model captures systemic financial collapses, whereas Meeks
et al. consider a calibrated model and study its ability to reproduce business-cycle moments.
Verona et al. (2013) propose a different approach with a monopolistic shadow banking system
and a countercyclical markup rule. Their model predicts a substantial boom-bust cycle when
monetary policy is too loose for too long. We can also mention Goodhart et al. (2013), who use a
simple 2-periodmodel with traditional and shadow banks to study various regulation schemes,
and Moreira and Savov (2017), who develop a continuous-time model to study episodes of
liquidity crisis in shadow banking. There is a broader literature onmacro-prudential regulation
in DSGE models. For example, De Walque et al. (2010) and Covas and Fujita (2010) illustrate
the procyclicality of time-varying capital requirements, while Angeloni and Faia (2013) and
Angelini et al. (2014) characterize optimal capital requirements in various contexts. Our paper
also addresses macro-prudential regulation but takes into account the existence of the shadow
sector.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model, while Section 3 presents
our empirical strategy and the estimation results. Section 4 introduces our main results, while
Section 5 concludes.
2 Model
We augment a standard RBCmodel with a banking sector composed of traditional and shadow
banks. Both types of banks intermediate credit between savers (households) and borrowers
(non-financial firms) but finance through different liabilities and face different levels of macro-
prudential regulation. In particular, traditional banks finance via household deposits and own
bank capital, whereas shadow banks finance through wholesale markets. Additionally, tradi-
tional banks face capital requirements while shadow banks are not regulated.3
2.1 Non-financial firm
The representative firm produces the final good using a Cobb-Douglas technology
ft = ǫ
z
t k
1−α
t−1 h
α
t ,
3This simple framework is in line with the Basel I Accord, which was in force during most of our estimation
sample. Indeed, according to the Basel I regulation, traditional banks’ own capital had to be above a given fraction
η¯ > 0 of risk-weighted assets. The weight on traditional loans was 100%, while that on securitized assets with the
highest rating (i.e., most securitized assets before the 2008 crisis) was 0%. Shadow banks were not regulated.
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where ǫzt , kt−1, and ht respectively denote total factor productivity (TFP), capital, and hours
worked, while α ∈ (0, 1) is the elasticity of output with respect to hours. TFP evolves according
to
ln ǫzt = ρz ln ǫ
z
t−1 + σzuz,t,
where ρz ∈ (0, 1), σz > 0, and uz,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1).
The firm rents capital at price rkt and pays an hourly wage wt. Profit maximization requires
(1− α) ft/kt−1 = r
k
t , α ft/ht = wt.
Because the firm borrows capital from traditional and shadow banks, the general equilibrium
of the model will be such that kt = lt + st, where lt denotes traditional loans and st is shadow
credit.
2.2 Traditional bank
The representative traditional bank holds two types of assets, traditional loans and asset-backed
securities issued by shadow banks, respectively denoted lt and abst. It finances through house-
hold deposits dt and own capital nt, so that its balance sheet verifies
qtlt + abst = nt + dt,
where qt is the price of capital.
Because loans are usually long-term assets while ABS are normally liquid and marketable, we
introduce a portfolio adjustment cost limiting the bank’s ability to substitute between assets.
This cost is given by the quadratic function
Γ
(
abst
qtlt
)
=
γ
2
(
abst
qtlt
−
abs
l
)2
,
where bars denote steady-state levels and γ ≥ 0. This function verifies Γ(abs/l) = Γ′(abs/l) =
0, so that portfolio costs only affect the dynamic of the model and not its steady state (we also
exploit the fact that q = 1 in these expressions). Andrès et al. (2004) and Chen et al. (2012) use
a very similar setup to capture imperfect substitution between short- and long-term assets.
Turning to macro-prudential regulation, bank capital nt should not be lower than a given frac-
tion η of risk-weighted assets. Since we assume a zero weight on ABS, risk-weighted assets
correspond to traditional loans qtlt. Despite this asymmetric regulation, the bank has an incen-
tive to hold traditional loans because the return onABS is lower in equilibrium (see equation (5)
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below). Formally, we define excess bank capital as xt = nt − ηqtlt and the capital constraint
should imply xt ≥ 0. Because dealing with this type of occasionally binding constraints re-
mains computationally challenging, we follow Enders et al. (2011) and Kollmann (2013) and
instead assume that the bank can hold less capital than required subject to a penalty cost pro-
portional to the capital gap. This capital cost function is given by
Θ(xt) = −θ1 ln (1+ θ2xt) ,
with θ1, θ2 ≥ 0 and x = 0 in steady state. This specification implies that Θ(0) = 0, Θ
′(0) =
−θ1θ2 ≤ 0 and Θ
′′(0) = θ1θ
2
2 ≥ 0, so that capital costs are decreasing and convex in xt around
the steady state.
At any given date, the bank receives income from its holdings of loans and ABS, inherited from
the previous period. On top of the two costs Γt and Θt, it also pays an interest on household
deposits and incurs a loan monitoring cost ǫlt per unit of supplied loans. We introduce this
cost, which directly affects the lending rate in equilibrium, to capture time variations in the
risk premium that our framework does not explicitly consider. Summing up, the traditional
bank’s profit function verifies
πbt =
[
rkt + (1− δ)qt
]
lt−1 + (1+ r
a
t−1)abst−1 + dt
−Γ [abst/(qtlt)]−Θ(xt)− (1+ r
d
t−1)dt−1 − (1+ ǫ
l
t)qtlt − abst, (1)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is the depreciation rate of physical capital. Remark that the rate of return on
ABS, rat−1, is predetermined with respect to date-t events, whereas the rate of return on loans is
not. This timing difference captures the idea that ABS are fixed-income instruments supposed
to provide a safe return. The rate of return on household deposits is also predetermined. The
loan monitoring cost evolves according to
ǫlt = ρlǫ
l
t−1 + σlul,t,
with ρl ∈ (0, 1), σl > 0, and ul,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1).
Profit maximization with respect to deposits, loans, and ABS implies
1+ Θ′t = EtΛt,t+1(1+ r
d
t ),
ǫlt − ηΘ
′
t − Γ
′
t
abst
(qtlt)2
= EtΛt,t+1
[
(1− δ)qt+1 + r
k
t+1
qt
− (1+ rdt )
]
,
Γ′t
1
qtlt
= EtΛt,t+1(r
a
t − r
d
t ), (2)
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where Λt,t+1 is the household’s stochastic discount factor between periods t and t + 1. These
conditions all have simple interpretations. The first one equalizes the marginal costs of issuing
liabilities through bank capital or deposits. The second one shows that the spread between the
lending and deposit rates covers all costs related to traditional loans (i.e. the loan monitoring,
portfolio, and regulation costs). The third one shows that the spread between the ABS return
and the deposit rate only needs to cover the portfolio cost since there is neither monitoring nor
regulation cost related to ABS holdings.
The last condition is key for the interaction between traditional and shadow banks in our
model. Taking a linear approximation around the deterministic steady state, we obtain
γ
l
(̂
abst
qtlt
)
= Λ
(
rˆat − rˆ
d
t
)
, (3)
where hats denote (level) deviations from the steady state. This equation demonstrates that an
increase in the return on ABS stimulates ABS holdings by the traditional bank, all other things
equal. Moreover, the lower the portfolio adjustment cost γ, the higher the transmission.
Of course, this stylized representation abstracts from many forces driving the shadow sector.
To capture the dynamics of shadow credit in the data, we introduce an additional disturbance
in the model. We call it the shadow wedge and interpret it as a shadow default shock. Hence,
we slightly modify the above setup by assuming that, in every period, the shadow bank may
partially default on the ABS it has issued in the past. However, in the event of default, the
shadow bank compensates the traditional bank through a lump-sum transfer. Corsetti et al.
(2013) use a similar specification in a model of sovereign credit risk. Letting ǫat and tt denote the
rate of default on ABS and the transfer, the profit of the traditional bank (1) and the optimality
condition with respect to ABS holdings (2) become
πbt =
[
rkt + (1− δ)qt
]
lt−1 + (1− ǫ
a
t )(1+ r
a
t−1)abst−1 + dt + tt
−Γ [abst/(qtlt)]−Θ(xt)− (1+ r
d
t−1)dt−1 − (1+ ǫ
l
t)qtlt − abst,
Γ′t
1
qtlt
= EtΛt,t+1
[
(1− ǫat+1)(1+ r
a
t )− (1+ r
d
t )
]
.
In that case, equation (3) becomes
γ
l
(̂
abst
qtlt
)
+ Etǫ
a
t+1 = Λ
(
rˆat − rˆ
d
t
)
, (4)
so that an increase in the shadow wedge raises the required return on ABS and reduces ABS
holdings, all other things equal. The shadow wedge evolves according to
ǫat = ρaǫ
a
t−1 + σaua,t,
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with ρa ∈ (0, 1), σa > 0, and ua,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1).
2.3 Shadow bank
We model shadow banking using an overlapping generation structure in which each shadow
intermediary lives for 2 periods. At any date t, a new shadow bank enters themarket and issues
ABS in order to lend to the non-financial firm.4 ABS issuance entails a per-unit cost 0 < a < 1,5
so that the shadow bank’s balance sheet verifies qtst = (1− a)abst. At date t+ 1, the bank earns
a profit
πst =
[
rkt + (1− δ)qt
]
st−1 − (1− ǫ
a
t )(1+ r
a
t−1)abst−1 − tt
and leaves the market. As already mentioned, ǫat is the rate of shadow default and tt the lump-
sum compensation paid to the traditional bank.
We assume free entry in shadow banking with an expected 0-profit condition EtΛt,t+1π
s
t+1 = 0.
Using the bank’s balance sheet, this yields
(1− a)EtΛt,t+1
rkt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1
qt
= EtΛt,t+1
[
(1− ǫat+1)(1+ r
a
t ) +
tt+1
abst
]
.
When the lump-sum transfer fully compensates the losses, tt = ǫat (1 + r
a
t−1)abst−1 and the
equation becomes
(1− a)EtΛt,t+1
rkt+1 + (1− δ)qt+1
qt
= (1+ rat )EtΛt,t+1. (5)
Condition (5) simply equates the expected return of issuing one additional ABSwith itsmarginal
cost. Again, notice that the shadow bank is not regulated in the model, in accordance with the
Basel I Accord.
2.4 Household
The household owns the whole economy and maximizes
U0 = E0
∞
∑
t=0
βt

ln ct + ǫdt ln dt − ǫmt1+ ψ
(
ht
h
φ
t−1
)1+ψ ,
4Since ABS are held by traditional banks in our model, the shadow bank has the flavor of a special-purpose
vehicle (SPV) created by the bank to achieve off-balance sheet accounting treatment for its loans and improve its
capital ratio. See the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) for a comprehensive presentation of SPVs.
5This cost is a shortcut for more sophisticated management costs, such as those considered in Christiano et al.
(2003), Enders et al. (2011), or Ireland (2014).
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where β ∈ (0, 1) is the discount rate and ct is consumption. Deposits provide utility through a
standard liquidity motive, which is shifted over time by the disturbance ǫdt . The latter evolves
according to
ln ǫdt = ρd ln ǫ
d
t−1 + (1− ρd) ln ǫ
d + σdud,t,
where ǫd > 0, ρd ∈ (0, 1), σd > 0, and ud,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1).
6
The parameter ψ ≥ 0 captures the curvature in labor disutility and φ measures habit persis-
tence in labor: φ < 0 implies intertemporal substitutability in labor supply, whereas φ > 0
implies intertemporal complementarity. Empirically, the specification with complementarity
seems more relevant because it translates habits in labor into output persistence.7 Labor disu-
tility is subject to a preference or labor wedge shock ǫmt , which captures unmodeled distortions
in the labor market (Chari et al., 2007). This shock evolves according to
ln ǫmt = ρm ln ǫ
m
t−1 + (1− ρm) ln ǫ
m + σmum,t,
where ǫm > 0, ρm ∈ (0, 1), σm > 0, and um,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1).
Finally, the household faces a flow budget constraint given by
ct + dt = wtht + (1+ r
d
t−1)dt−1 + π
b
t + π
s
t .
Utility maximization with respect to consumption, deposits, and hours worked yields
1
ct
=
ǫdt
dt
+ βEt
1+ rdt
ct+1
,
mtzt =
α ft
ct
+ βφEtmt+1zt+1,
where zt ≡ (ht/h
φ
t−1)
1+ψ. The first condition is the intertemporal Euler equation pinning down
the optimal consumption-saving plan, whereas the second one defines the labor supply sched-
ule.
2.5 Closing the model
The household’s stochastic discount factor between t and t + 1 is Λt,t+1 = βct/ct+1. We define
physical investment as ǫitit = kt − (1 − δ)kt−1, where ǫ
i
t is an investment-specific efficiency
6The parameter ǫd allows to calibrate Θ′ < 0 at the steady state. Indeed, it is easy to show that when ǫd = 0, the
general equilibrium is such that β(1+ rd) = 1 from the household’s Euler equation, which implies Θ
′
= 0 from the
traditional bank’s first-order conditions. A strictly positive ǫd lowers rd and allows for a negative marginal capital
cost.
7See, e.g., Bouakez and Kano (2006), Dupaigne et al. (2007), or Fève et al. (2013).
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shock evolving according to
ln ǫit = ρi ln ǫ
i
t−1 + σiui,t,
where ρi ∈ (0, 1), σi > 0, and ui,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1). It is straightforward to verify that the equilib-
rium price of capital verifies qt = 1/ǫit.
Summing all budget constraints, we recover the aggregate resource constraint of the model:
ft = ct + it + Γ
(
abst
qtlt
)
+ Θ(xt) + ǫ
l
tqtlt + a abst.
Finally, we define GDP, the share of shadow banking in total credit, the leverage in the tradi-
tional banking sector, and the lending-deposit spread as
yt = ct + it, sharet =
st
lt + st
, leveraget =
qtlt
nt
, spreadt =
rkt + (1− δ)qt
qt−1
− (1+ rdt−1).
3 Econometric Approach
We solve the model with standard linearization techniques and estimate it using Bayesian
methods. This section discusses the data, the parameter estimates, and the fit of the model.
3.1 Data
We estimate the model using six observables: consumption, investment, hours worked, the
share of shadow banking in total credit, the leverage in the traditional banking sector, and the
credit spread:
[ln ct, ln it, ln ht, sharet, leveraget, spreadt] .
This selection of observables is helpful to identify the key parameters of the model from the
data. In particular, the joint behavior of the shadow share and the spread should be informative
about the size of portfolio costs, while the joint properties of leverage and the credit spread
should identify the convexity of the excess capital cost function. We remove quadratic trends
from all series, except for the spread which is simply demeaned.8
The estimation sample is quarterly and runs from 1980Q1 to 2016Q4. The series for consump-
tion and investment come from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, whereas the hours series is
borrowed from Neville and Ramey (2009). For the definitions of the traditional and shadow
8Iacoviello (2015) also detrends his observables prior to estimating a model with financial variables. In the data,
financial variables typically have their own trends, that a model with balanced-growth restrictions cannot easily
capture.
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Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Value Description
α 2/3 Labor share
β 0.975 Discount factor
δ 0.025 Capital depreciation rate
h 0.20 Steady-state hours
ψ 2 Hours curvature in utility
share 0.26 Shadow share
η 0.10 Capital requirement
−Θ′(0) 0.025 Marginal excess capital cost
a 0.0026 ABS issuance cost
banking sectors, we follow Meeks et al. (2017). In particular, we consider security brokers and
dealers and issuers of asset-backed securities as shadow banks and define shadow credit as
the sum of their financial assets, extracted from the Financial Accounts of the United States.
We consider private depository institutions as traditional banks and define traditional credit as
their total financial assets minus vault cash, reserves at the Federal Reserve, and holdings of
agency- and GSE-backed securities. The shadow share is then the ratio between shadow credit
and total credit, defined as the sum of traditional and shadow credit. We use the leverage of
commercial banks to proxy for the leverage of traditional banks. Finally, our spread measure
is Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond yield relative to the yield on 10-year treasury bonds.
Appendix A provides more details on the data.
3.2 Estimation results
We partition the parameters in two sets. The first one contains 9 parameters kept fixed during
estimation. Regarding standard parameters, we set α = 2/3, β = 0.975, and δ = 0.025. We also
calibrate ǫm so that hours equal h = 0.2 in steady state and set the labor supply parameter ψ
to 2, in accordance with previous studies.9 We calibrate the preference weight on deposits ǫd
to replicate the average shadow share of 0.26 we find in the data. We also set the steady-state
capital adequacy ratio to η = 10%, which implies an average leverage ratio of 10 for traditional
banks. Finally, we calibrate Θ′(0) and a to reproduce 2 targets: zero excess bank capital (x = 0)
and zero real return on deposits (rd = 0).10 These values are reported in Table 1.
9For instance, Smets and Wouters (2007) estimate this parameter at 1.92 in a model without leisure habits,
which implies a Frisch elasticity of labor supply close to 0.5. In our setup with habits, the Frisch elasticity becomes
1/[(1− φ)(1+ ψ)− 1], so that our estimated elasticity may differ from 0.5 depending on the value of φ.
10The calibration implies that ABS issuance costs represent about 0.9% of GDP in steady state, in line with the
related literature (see Enders et al., 2011).
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Table 2: Estimation Results
Parameter Description Prior distribution Posterior distribution
Distribution Mean SD Mode [5%, 95%]
φ Labor habits Beta 0.60 0.15 0.65 [ 0.60, 0.69]
γ Portfolio adjustment cost Gamma 0.20 0.10 0.17 [ 0.15, 0.19]
θ2 Convexity of excess capital cost Gamma 0.20 0.10 0.11 [ 0.09, 0.14]
ρz AR technology shock Beta 0.60 0.20 0.95 [ 0.95, 0.96]
ρi AR investment shock Beta 0.60 0.20 0.24 [ 0.17, 0.31]
ρm AR labor wedge shock Beta 0.60 0.20 0.71 [ 0.65, 0.77]
ρl AR monitoring cost shock Beta 0.60 0.20 0.96 [ 0.95, 0.97]
ρa AR shadow wedge shock Beta 0.60 0.20 0.99 [ 0.98, 0.99]
ρd AR deposit preference shock Beta 0.60 0.20 0.89 [ 0.86, 0.92]
100σz SD technology shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 0.60 [ 0.56, 0.65]
1000σi SD investment shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 2.39 [ 2.19, 2.62]
100σm SD labor wedge shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 1.26 [ 1.15, 1.39]
10000σl SD monitoring cost shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 4.05 [ 3.71, 4.56]
10000σa SD shadow wedge shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 4.48 [ 4.08, 5.12]
100σd SD deposit preference shock Inv. Gamma 1.00 3.00 1.46 [ 1.28, 1.70]
Notes. The posterior distribution is constructed from the random-walk Metropolis-Hastings algorithm with a
single chain of 250,000 draws, after a burn-in period of 250,000 draws.
The second set contains 15 parameters estimated from the data. Three of them have a structural
interpretation: the labor habit parameter φ, the portfolio adjustment cost γ, and the convexity
of the excess capital cost function θ2. The last two are especially important because they largely
determine the degree of interaction between the traditional and shadow banking sectors in
the model. The twelve other parameters define the shock processes. Table 2 reports the prior
and posterior distributions. We adopt a standard Beta prior for the habit coefficient, while
we use Gamma priors centered at moderate values for the portfolio and excess capital cost
parameters. Additionally, we follow Christiano et al. (2011) in introducing an endogenous
prior term penalizing parameter vectors that result in a poor match between the theoretical
and empirical standard deviations of our observables.11
At the posterior mode, the estimated value of φ is close to that obtained in Dupaigne et al.
(2007) and Fève et al. (2013), indicating strong intertemporal complementarity in labor supply.
Both the portfolio adjustment cost γ and the curvature of the excess capital cost function θ2
are well identified from the data, with tight posterior distributions. The estimates imply that a
temporary one percentage point (pp.) increase in the capital adequacy ratio η raises the annual
loan-deposit spread by about 8 basis points on impact (see Figure 3 below). This is somewhat
below the 20 basis points reported in Kollmann (2013), but very much in line with the 8.5
11We use the Dynare implementation of this approach.
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Table 3: Model Fit
Variable Moments
σx ρx ρxy
Data Model Data Model Data Model
Consumption 0.02 0.03 0.97 0.99 0.85 0.81
Investment 0.09 0.10 0.98 0.96 0.96 0.91
Hours 0.03 0.03 0.97 0.97 0.65 0.50
Share 0.04 0.05 0.99 0.98 0.47 0.02
Leverage 0.22 0.26 0.89 0.94 0.56 -0.35
Spread 0.71 0.92 0.86 0.48 -0.15 -0.28
Notes. The sample is 1980Q1-2016Q4 for empirical moments, while theoretical moments are computed at the
posterior mean. σx denotes the standard deviation, ρx the first-order autocorrelation, and ρxy the contempora-
neous correlation with GDP. The spread is expressed in annualized percentage points.
basis points estimated by Baker and Wurgler (2015) from individual bank data.12 This bolsters
confidence in our identification strategy.
3.3 Fit and model properties
In spite of its simplicity, the model provides a reasonable fit of the data, as can be seen from
Table 3. Thanks to the endogenous prior, the volatilities of all observables are correctly repro-
duced. In terms of persistence, the fit is also good, except for the spread whose theoretical
autocorrelation is about half that measured in the data. Finally, the model captures well the
comovements between output on the one hand, and consumption, investment, hours worked,
and the spread on the other hand. It has difficulty reproducing that traditional and shadow
credit are very procyclical in the data, but this reflects to a certain extent our modeling ap-
proach matching total credit intermediation with the capital stock, which is a very smooth
variable.13
The model also yields a fairly standard decomposition of business cycles in a real economy.14
The neutral productivity shock accounts for about 60, 70, and 45 percent of the unconditional
variances of GDP, consumption, and investment, while the labor wedge shock drives about
50 percent of movements in hours worked. The loan monitoring cost has significant effects
on real and financial variables: in particular, it explains between 15 and 30 percent of GDP,
12Baker and Wurgler (2015) estimate that a 1 pp. increase in bank capital requirements would raise the annual
average cost of bank capital by 8.5 basis points. They remark that with competitive financial markets, lending-
deposit spreads would rise by the same amount.
13Many mechanisms that we omit for simplicity, such as a working capital channel or binding collateral con-
straints would help make credit intermediation more procyclical in the model.
14We report the exact decomposition in Online Appendix II.
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Table 4: Amplification Effects from the Shadow Sector
Variables Shocks
All uz ui um ul ud uη
GDP 1.05 1.06 1.05 1.03 0.89 0.99 0.85
Investment 1.04 1.09 1.01 1.04 0.85 1.07 0.78
Notes. Entries represent the standard deviation of the variable in the baseline model relative to that in the
counterfactual economy with fixed shadow credit. An entry above (below) 1 implies that shadow banking
amplifies (dampens) the volatility of the variable after the shock(s). Column ’All’ corresponds to the estimates
in Table 2 with all shocks (excluding regulation); uz is the neutral productivity shock, ui is the investment shock,
um is the labor wedge shock, ul is the loanmonitoring cost shock, ud is the deposit shock, and uη is the regulation
shock introduced in Section 4.2.
consumption, and investment fluctuations. Finally, the shadow wedge accounts for about 70
percent of the movements in the shadow share and 30 percent of those in leverage, which is
also explained by the deposit preference shock. Overall, the three financial shocks (loan mon-
itoring cost, shadow wedge, and deposit preference) cause between 30 and 40 percent of the
fluctuations in output and investment, suggesting that the model contains enough propagation
mechanisms to ensure the transmission of financial shocks to the real economy.
4 Shadow Banking in General Equilibrium
This section analyzes how the introduction of shadow banks in the model affects its behavior.
To do so, we contrast our benchmark economy with shadow banks to a counterfactual one in
which shadow credit is fixed at its steady-state level. Formally, we obtain the counterfactual
economy by (i) replacing the first-order condition of the traditional bank with respect to ABS,
eq. (4), by abst = abs, (ii) replacing the free-entry condition in the shadow sector, eq. (5), by
rat = r
a, and (iii) removing the shadow wedge shock. We keep all parameters at their estimated
values.
4.1 A source of amplification. . .
Our first finding is that shadow banking is a powerful source of amplification in general equi-
librium. Indeed, the effects of most shocks hitting the economy are larger in our baseline model
than in the counterfactual economy with fixed shadow credit.
To demonstrate this, we report in Table 4 the ratios between the standard deviations of GDP
and investment in the benchmark model and the same statistics for the counterfactual econ-
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Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions after a Positive Productivity Shock
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Notes. Deviations from steady states are expressed in percent for investment and ABS, in percent of steady-state
regulatory capital for excess bank capital, and in annualized percentage points for the spread.
omy. We compute these standard deviations for each individual shock, as well as for all shocks
together.15 A ratio above (below) 1 means that shadow banking amplifies (dampens) the effects
of the shock(s). Globally, it is clear that the presence of shadow banks in the model increases
the volatility of the economy: as shown in column ’All,’ the standard deviation of GDP in the
baseline model is higher by about 5% and that of investment by 4%, compared to the coun-
terfactual with fixed shadow credit. This is explained by the amplification of most individual
shocks. In particular, the amplification of the neutral productivity shock uz, which explains the
bulk of the movements in real variables, reaches almost 10% for investment.
To understand how shadow banking generates amplification, we compare the dynamics trig-
gered by a positive neutral productivity shock in the baseline and counterfactual economies.
These dynamics are illustrated through impulse-response functions (IRFs) in Figure 1, in blue
for the benchmark model and in red for the counterfactual one. To organize the discussion, it
is useful to start with the counterfactual economy with fixed shadow credit. After the shock,
15The shadow wedge shock does not appear in the table since it is removed from the counterfactual model.
Additionally, the table reports the statistics for a regulation shock introduced in Section 4.2. This regulation shock
is not present in the estimated model, so that it is not included when computing the results for all shocks.
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Figure 2: Impulse Response Functions after a Positive Loan Monitoring Cost Shock
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Notes. Deviations from steady states are expressed in percent for investment and ABS, in percent of steady-state
regulatory capital for excess bank capital, and in annualized percentage points for the spread.
the traditional bank wants to increase its loan supply because the marginal product of capi-
tal is higher. However, the bank simultaneously needs to raise additional capital to comply
with macro-prudential regulation. This takes time, so that the bank falls short of its legal re-
quirements during the first 15 quarters. The implied cost forces the bank to increase the credit
spread, which raises by about 1.5 basis point in annual terms at its peak.
In the baseline model with flexible shadow credit, the same logic applies but the traditional
bank can limit capital costs by substituting regulated standard loans with unregulated ABS
holdings. The portfolio cost limits this regulatory arbitrage, but the substitution between tra-
ditional and shadow credit is enough to limit the fall in excess bank capital. As a result, credit
spreads are lower in the baseline economy and this stimulates GDP and investment. A simi-
lar logic — the substitution toward shadow credit keeping intermediation costs small — also
explains the amplification of the investment, labor wedge, and deposit shocks.
The story related to the loan monitoring cost shock is slightly different. As shown in Figure 2,
a shock raising the cost of loan monitoring makes traditional intermediation more expensive,
so that credit spreads increase and the economy enters a recession. The existence of shadow
16
intermediation helps mitigate this inefficiency, as reallocating credit supply toward shadow
banks allows to partly escape from the cost. In this case, credit spreads increase less and the
recession is less severe, so that shadow banking dis-amplifies the effects of the shock. A similar
intuition applies to the regulation shock, which we present next.
4.2 . . . and of regulatory arbitrage
The model also implies that shadow banking activity expands when traditional banks face
tighter regulatory constraints. This property, which constitutes in our view a key interaction
between traditional and shadow banks, is in line with existing empirical studies. For instance,
Buchak et al. (2017) find in the data that shadow banks are more likely to enter markets in
which the regulatory burden makes lending more difficult for depository institutions in the
US.
The easiest way to emphasize this regulatory arbitrage is to replace the capital adequacy ratio
parameter η by a simple autoregressive stochastic process:
ηt = ρηηt−1 + (1− ρη)η + σηuη,t,
with
∣∣ρη∣∣ < 1, ση > 0, and uη,t ∼ i.i.d.N(0, 1). Following Angelini et al. (2014), we calibrate the
persistence parameter ρη to 0.90 and we consider a shock triggering an initial increase of 1 pp.
in the capital adequacy ratio. Figure 3 reports the IRFs to this shock in our benchmark model,
as well as in the counterfactual economy with fixed shadow credit.
As expected, an increase in the capital adequacy ratio has detrimental effects on economic activ-
ity. Because it is costly to obtain additional capital in the short run, the bank raises the lending
spread by 10 basis points in the counterfactual model with fixed shadow. The bank also cuts
its loan supply to decrease leverage, which penalizes investment and output. When shadow
banks are free to adjust, the traditional bank exploits the arbitrage between regulated loans and
unregulated ABS, so that credit intermediation shifts toward the shadow sector. The equilib-
rium effect of the regulation shock on the lending spread is smaller and the falls in investment
and output are less pronounced. The last column in Table 4 captures this dampening effect, as
the presence of shadow banks in the model reduces by 20 to 25% the fluctuations that would
be caused by the regulation shock.
This regulatory arbitrage may be a concern for macro-prudential authorities, since it weakens
the effectiveness of policy measures targeting only traditional banks. This, together with the
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Figure 3: Impulse Response Functions after a Positive Regulation Shock
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amplification role of shadow banks, raises the possibility that regulating both traditional and
shadow credit might be a superior strategy. In the next section, we use our model as a simple
laboratory to evaluate this possibility.
5 Macro-prudential Regulation with Shadow Banks
Duringmost of our estimation sample, macro-prudential regulationwas either limited or based
on the 1988 Basel I Accord. After the 2008 financial crisis, a new set of rules named Basel III
has been adopted and is currently being implemented. Roughly speaking, Basel III allows for a
countercyclical capital buffer and extends regulation beyond traditional loans.16 In this section,
we examine whether these new policy tools would help stabilize aggregate fluctuations in our
model with traditional and shadow banks.
We emphasize that our analysis is strictly positive, even if we implicitly assume in our dis-
16The 2004 Basel II Accord had not been fully implemented when the crisis started in 2007-2008. Online Ap-
pendix III provides an overview of the successive Basel Accords.
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cussions that the macro-prudential authority is concerned with macroeconomic volatility and
prefers stable outcomes. Indeed, the Bank of England (2009), the Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision (2010), and Angelini et al. (2014) provide theoretical and empirical arguments
suggesting that limiting credit volatility may be optimal from a normative perspective.
5.1 Three regulation schemes
Following Angelini et al. (2014), we represent macro-prudential policy with a time-varying
capital requirement. This simple instrument allows to capture in a transparent fashion the
countercyclical buffer and the extended regulation introduced by the Basel III package. Because
the buffer allows national regulators to increase capital requirements in periods of high credit
growth, we specify the policy rule for ηt as
ηt = η + κη
(
∆bt
yt
−
∆b
y
)
, (6)
where ∆bt is a measure of credit growth (defined below) and κη ≥ 0 is the responsiveness of
capital requirements to credit growth.17 The latter variable is normalized by GDP, in line with
the prescriptions of the Basel III regulation.
In our experiment, we consider three different regulation schemes, that correspond to different
calibrations of eq. (6) and different computations of risk-weighted assets. The benchmark case
keeps capital requirements constant (κη = 0); it broadly captures the Basel I framework. The
second case applies a countercyclical buffer (κη > 0) to traditional credit only. In that case,
(gross) credit growth is measured by ∆bt = qtlt − (1− δ)qt−1lt−1 and risk-weighted assets are
computed with a 100% weight on traditional loans and a 0% weight on ABS. This corresponds
to a narrow application of Basel III that leaves shadow banking unregulated. Finally, the third
case incorporates both a countercyclical buffer (κη > 0) and a regulation of shadow banking. In
that case, the policy rule reacts to total credit growth ∆bt = kt − (1− δ)kt−1 and risk-weighted
assets are computed with a 100% weight on both traditional loans and ABS. This corresponds
to a broad application of Basel III.18 We fix κη = 0.80 for both the narrow and broad regulation
17Remark there is no autoregressive component in our specification of the policy rule. Indeed, capital require-
ments increase and peak well past the period of rapid credit growth in presence of such a persistence term, which
in our view does not capture correctly the logic of Basel III.
18The Basel III Accord also recommends to regulate systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) that
are not traditional banks on a case-by-case basis. We could assume that the shadow bank is a SIFI in the model
and regulate it. However, this would require important changes to transform the shadow bank into an infinitely-
lived agent with capital. Our approach, in which ABS are regulated in the balanced sheet of the traditional bank,
corresponds to an indirect regulation of shadow banking since it limits its ability to expand.
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Table 5: Economic Volatility under Alternative Regulation Schemes
Variables Regulation
Baseline Narrow Broad
GDP 4.40 4.30 4.20
Investment 9.84 9.47 9.12
Notes. Entries are the standard deviations (×100) of the variables. ‘Baseline’ corresponds to the first case with
constant requirements, ’Narrow’ is the second case with a countercyclical buffer applied to traditional credit,
and ’Broad’ is the third case with a countercyclical buffer applied to both traditional and shadow credit.
cases. This value implies that capital requirements exceed η + 0.025 = 0.125 about once every
8 years.19
The third case with broad regulation requires introducing some changes in the model. Because
ABS are now regulated, the definition of excess capital becomes xt = nt − ηtqtlt − ηat abst, with
ηat = ηt − η. This specification ensures that η
a = 0 on average, which keeps the steady state
of the model unchanged, while allowing the regulation of ABS to move one-for-one with that
of traditional loans in a dynamic setting. In that case, the linearized spread shown in eq. (4)
becomes
−Θ′(0)ηat +
γ
l
(̂
abst
qtlt
)
+ Etǫ
a
t+1 = Λ
(
rˆat − rˆ
d
t
)
.
Since Θ′(0) < 0, this equation shows that an increase in ABS regulation forces the traditional
bank to demand higher ABS returns, making shadow intermediation more costly and less at-
tractive.
5.2 Comparing the schemes
We study the stabilization properties of the three regulation schemes — constant capital re-
quirements, countercyclical buffer with narrow regulation, and countercyclical buffer with
broad regulation — in different ways. First, we show how they affect the volatility of GDP
and investment in equilibrium. Second, to develop the underlying intuition, we consider in
more detail how the rules change the behavior of the economy after a productivity shock. Fi-
nally, we perform a counterfactual historical exercise asking if the boom-bust cycle in credit
associated with the 2007-2008 financial crisis would have been prevented by tighter regulation.
Table 5 reports the standard deviations of GDP and investment implied by the model under
19The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010) limits the capital buffer to be within zero and 2.5% of
risk-weighted assets. However, this is not a hard ceiling and the buffer may exceed 2.5% if deemed appropriate in
a national context.
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the three regulations. In all cases, the shock processes evolve as estimated in Section 3. The
entries demonstrate that, while the narrow regulation helps stabilize the economy, the broad
regulation scheme is about twice as effective. Indeed, compared to the baseline with constant
requirements, the standard deviations of GDP and investment fall by 3 and 4% under the nar-
row scheme, and by 5% and 8% under the broad rule. This result echoes our earlier discussion
about regulatory arbitrage: macro-prudential policymeasures that target only traditional credit
are likely to be less effective at stabilizing the economy than broader measures if intermediation
can be easily redirected toward shadow banks.
To understand how the economy behaves under the alternative schemes, Figure 4 shows the
dynamics triggered by a positive neutral productivity shock under each policy. We focus on
the productivity shock because, as mentioned above, it is the major driver of real variables in
the model. The benchmark case with constant requirements corresponds to the one discussed
in Section 4.1: after the shock, loan supply increases because the marginal product of capital is
higher and credit partly reallocates toward the shadow sector. With a countercyclical require-
ment targeting only traditional credit, as in the narrow regulation, shadow credit increases
even more as lending costs rise in the traditional sector. This leakage weakens the dampening
effect of the regulation and, indeed, the IRF of investment looks very similar to the baseline
one. When the countercyclical buffer applies to both traditional and shadow credit, as in the
broad scheme, it is not possible anymore to exploit the regulatory arbitrage and the dampen-
ing effect on investment is more important, especially so during the first ten periods with fast
credit growth. In all cases, the implied increase in the regulatory capital ratio is limited to less
than 0.3 percentage points.
Finally, we evaluate the effects of the alternative regulation schemes through a counterfactual
historical exercise. We use our estimated model (which corresponds to the baseline regulation
scenario with constant requirements for traditional loans) to recover the structural shocks that
have hit the economy between 1980 and 2016. Then, we feed these shocks into a counterfactual
model in which either the narrow or broad regulation rules applies. Figure 5 reports the coun-
terfactual paths of GDP and investment before, during, and after the financial crisis. A striking
result is that the narrow rule is associated with excess volatility compared to the benchmark
case, so that it would have amplified, rather than reduced, the boom-bust cycle. The behavior
of the shadow wedge, whose effects are amplified by the narrow rule, explains this pattern.20
20The historical shock decomposition signals that the shadow wedge supported investment during the expan-
sion and penalized it during the crisis. The narrow regulation amplifies the effects of this shock because it increases
the traditional bank’s incentives to substitute loans with ABS holdings. This explains why the narrow rule would
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Figure 4: Impulse Response Functions after a Productivity Shock under Alternative Regulation
Schemes
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Figure 5: Counterfactual Historical Paths
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‘Baseline’ corresponds to the first case with constant requirements (i.e., the observables), ’Narrow’ is the second
case with a countercyclical buffer applied to traditional credit, and ’Broad’ is the third case with a countercyclical
buffer applied to both traditional and shadow credit.
On the other hand, the broad rule regulating both traditional and shadow credit would have
been more successful in dampening the magnitude of the cycle. For instance, it would have re-
duced the 2007 peak in investment by 1.5 point and its 2010 through by 2 points, thus limiting
the magnitude of the collapse by a non-negligible 3.5 points. The dampening effect on output,
while less important, would still have represented about 1 point of GDP.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we propose and estimate a small-scale DSGE model with interacting traditional
and shadow banks. We obtain twomain results: (i) Shadow banking is a powerful amplification
mechanism because it helps escape important constraints from the traditional sector. (ii) This
leakage toward the shadow sector also reduces the effectiveness of macro-prudential policies
targeting only traditional banks. Our results even suggest that a countercyclical capital buffer,
if applied only to traditional banks, would have amplified the boom-bust cycle associated with
have destabilized the US economy around the Great Recession.
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the financial crisis of 2007-2008. On the other hand, a broader regulation scheme also targeting
shadow credit would have helped stabilize the economy.
Obviously, our framework remains very stylized. We see at least two interesting extensions.
First, it would be useful to extend our model to take into account monetary policy and nominal
frictions. Indeed, it would be interesting to see how introducing shadow banks in a medium-
scale DSGE model would change its properties. Moreover, monetary policy adds an asym-
metry between traditional and shadow banks, as only the former have access to central bank
liquidity. Second, it may be worth relaxing the assumption that the representative household
owns the whole economy. Indeed, this simplification makes default events irrelevant and po-
tentially prevents capturing some important dynamics of the data during the financial crisis.
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A Data
This appendix describes the sources and the construction of the observables used in estimation.
Consumption. Consumption expenditures on nondurable goods and services (BEA, NIPA Table
1.1.5, lines 5 and 6).
Investment. Sum of consumption expenditures on durable goods and fixed investment (BEA,
NIPA Table 1.1.5, lines 4 and 8).
Hours worked. Hours for all workers in the US economy (BLS series downloaded from Valerie
Ramey’s website).
Traditional credit. Total financial assets of private depository institutions minus their holdings of
vault cash, reserves at the Federal Reserve, and holdings of agency- and GSE-backed securities
(Z1 release, Table L110, line FL704090005 minus the sum of lines FL703025005, FL713113003,
and FL703061705).
Shadow credit. Sum of the total financial assets of ABS issuers (Z1 release, Table L127, line
FL674090005) and security brokers and dealers (Z1 release, Table L130, line FL664090005).
Shadow share. Computed as Shadow credit/(Traditional credit+ Shadow credit).
Leverage. Computed as Credit/(Assets− Liabilities), where all series pertain to US commercial
banks (downloaded from the FRED).
Credit spread. Moody’s seasoned Baa corporate bond yield relative to the yield on 10-year trea-
sury bonds, expressed in quarterly terms (downloaded from the FRED).
We seasonally adjust all series extracted from the Financial Accounts Z1 release using the X-12
algorithm implemented in IRIS. We deflate all nominal series by the GDP deflator (BEA, NIPA
Table 1.1.4, line 1) to obtain quantity series, which we express in per-capita terms using the
population series from the BEA (NIPA, Table 2.1, line 40).
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Online Appendix — Not for Publication
I Traditional and Shadow Banking in the US: A Review
Adrian and Ashcraft (2012) and Pozsar et al. (2013) emphasize three major differences between
the traditional and shadow banking sectors in the US. First, intermediaries in each sector fi-
nance through different types of liability: traditional banks mostly rely on deposits to ex-
tend new loans, whereas shadow banks finance on wholesale markets using tradable credit
instruments. Second, traditional banks have access to public sources of liquidity (for instance
from the Fed) or insurance (for instance from the FDIC), while shadow banks are excluded
from official public enhancements. Third, traditional banks generally perform the whole chain
of credit intermediation between borrowers and lenders within a single institution, whereas
lender-borrower intermediation is typically performed by a chain of different institutions in
the shadow sector. For simplicity, it may be helpful to think of the typical traditional bank as
a single institution issuing retail deposits to fund loans, while the typical shadow bank is ac-
tually a group of institutions transforming wholesale funding into lending through a complex
securitization process.
Because the generic term of shadow banking refers to a wide range of activities, there has been
some disagreement about how to properly measure it in the data. In this paper, we follow
Meeks et al. (2017) and Gertler et al. (2016) by restrict our definition of shadow banking to
security brokers and dealers and issuers of asset-backet securities. These institutions issue
tradable securities (wholesale funding) against an underlying pool of securitized assets (loans).
They operate about the same economic function as traditional banks, but operate with much
less capital and outside the Fed’s regulatory framework.
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II Variance Decomposition
This appendix provides the unconditional variance decomposition of key variables, as implied
by the estimated model.
Table 6: Unconditional Variance Decomposition
Variables Shocks
uz ui um ul ua ud
GDP 62 0 11 19 7 0
Consumption 72 1 5 15 6 1
Investment 47 0 15 28 10 0
Hours worked 26 0 54 11 7 3
Shadow share 0 0 0 22 77 0
Spread 0 67 0 23 11 0
Leverage 5 0 1 9 28 56
Notes. Entries represent percentages. uz is the neutral productivity shock, ui is the investment shock, um is the
labor wedge shock, ul is the loan monitoring cost shock, ua is the shadow wedge shock, and ud is the deposit
shock.
The neutral productivity shock explains most of the variability of real variables, but has little
effect on financial variables. On the other hand, financial shocks explain a significant share
of the variance of real variables. For instance, the loan monitoring cost ul accounts for 15 to
30 percent of the variance of GDP, consumption, and investment. The shadow wedge also ex-
plains 10 percent of investment. Two shocks are more specialized: the investment shock largely
explains the spread, whereas the deposit shock accounts mostly for movements in leverage.
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III A Review of Financial Regulation in the US and Application to a
Simple Model
This appendix reviews the evolution of the Basel regulation, with a special focus on the US
economy. It then proposes a simple model with traditional and shadow banks that could cap-
ture (part of) this regulation. Within the broad literature about banking regulation, the reader
may find more information in Masera (2013), Paskelian and Bell (2013), or Niemeyer (2016).
III.1 From Basel I to Basel III
The Basel Committee develops minimum standards for banking regulation. Countries are
therefore free to implement stricter rules, but not rules that are less strict. The Committee
has no legislative power, so decisions must be enforced by each country’s authority. The suc-
cessive agreements called Basel I, Basel II, Basel 2.5, and Basel III, are best viewed as gradual
refinements of a single regulatory framework, rather than entirely new and independent frame-
works. Below, we briefly review each of them.
The Basel I Accord was reached in 1988 and implemented in the following years. It stipulates
that traditional banks should have capital equal to at least 8% of their (credit) risk-weighted
assets (RWA). The highest weight is 100% (for corporate lending) and the lowest one is 0% (for
certain government securities). This agreement evolved over time, notably to take into account
market risk on top of credit risk.
The more complex Basel II Accord was concluded in 2004 to refine the computation of the RWA
and capital requirements. The agreement embeds 3 pillars. Pillar 1 defines minimum capital
requirements covering credit, market, and operational risks. These minimum requirements are
based on standardized approaches and/or internal models. Under Pillar 2, the supervisory au-
thority may impose additional capital requirements to individual banks, based on a qualitative
assessment of the bank’s balance sheet. Pillar 3 contains detailed requirements for the risks and
exposures that the bank must make public. When the financial crisis arose in 2007-2008, Basel
II was not yet fully implemented in most countries.
The aim of Basel 2.5, agreed in 2009, was to quickly rectify some shortcomings of Basel II that
had been revealed during the financial crisis. In particular, banks had grossly underestimated
the risk of holding complex securitized assets in their balance sheet. Because Basel 2.5 was only
a partial solution, a larger package known as Basel III was adopted between 2010 and 2011 and
will be progressively implemented through 2023.
A key element of Basel III is to increase the quantity of capital in the financial system. On top of
the 8% of RWA, Basel III adds a 2.5% capital conservation buffer, a 2.5% countercyclical buffer,
and a 2.5% extra buffer for globally systemically important banks. With the countercyclical
buffer, the Basel Committee has introduced an explicit macroeconomic dimension into pru-
dential regulation. Another key element is to increase the quality of capital, with most of the
regulatory capital consisting of Common equity Tier 1 capital (CET1). Basel III also includes,
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among other refinements, (i) a strengthening of capital requirements for certain securitization
operations, (ii) the possibility for countries to nominate more banks or financial institutions
as systematically important (SIFIs), (iii) capital overcharge for loans to SIFIs, (iv) the guaran-
tee that banks have a minimum level of liquid assets, (v) the limitation of the maturity mis-
match between assets and liabilities, (vi) the introduction of a complementary leverage ratio
requirement, (vii) restriction on the exposure to individual counterparts, and (viii) limitations
in accounting practices moving exposures between the trading and banking books.
III.2 Basel III and the Dodd-Frank Act
The Dodd-Frank Act (DFA) was passed in 2010 in the US to prevent the regulatory shortcom-
ings that have been blamed for the 2007-2008 crisis. This legislation creates a top layer of over-
sight (the Financial Stability Oversight Council, FSOC) for financial institutions and existing
regulatory agencies, provides a new resolution procedure for financial companies, and places
new regulatory restrictions on derivative assets. The DFA also promotes higher quantitative
and qualitative capital requirements and only allows US regulatory agencies to adopt the Basel
III guidelines as long as they do not violate the DFA floors. As a result, the US Basel III Final
Rule on capital standards has some specificities, as described below:
• The US implementation of Basel III is modulated according to the size of banks: all banks
must respect the minimum capital rule, but additional requirements are imposed on the
basis of size and complexity. Conversely, the EU has a more ‘one-size-fits-all’ approach.
• The regulation applies to all depository institutions, but also to systematically important
non-bank financial institutions designated by the FSOC.
• The US rule strengthens non-risk-weighted asset capital requirements, which may be-
come binding for large banks.
• Originators of securitized assets must retain at least 5% of the credit risk, a requirement
not included in Basel III.
III.3 The Basel/DFA Regulation in a Simple Model of the US Economy
We now propose a simple model capturing some elements of the Basel regulation. We start
from the Basel I rule, before turning to the Basel III/DFA rule.21
Consider a financial sector composed of traditional and shadow banks intermediating credit
between saving households and borrowing firms. The traditional bank finances assets (cor-
porate loans and ABS) through deposits and regulatory capital. Under Basel I, bank capital
must be above a constant fraction η I of RWA, where the weight αh on corporate loans is rela-
tively high and the weight αl on ABS (considered as high-quality securities with minimal risk)
21We abstract from Basel II and Basel 2.5, since the former was never fully implemented whereas the later was
only a temporary solution.
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is relatively low. Hence, capital in the traditional sector must verify
capital ≥ η IRWA = η I(αhloans+ αlABS).
The shadow bank has no access to deposits and finances by issuing ABS in wholesale markets.
It is not regulated under Basel I. Figure 6 summarizes this representation of the Basel I rule.
Figure 6: Aggregate Balance Sheets under Basel I
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Consider now the same economy under Basel III. Because the new rule requires a higher quan-
tity of capital, the coefficient η has to increase: η I I I ≥ η I . Moreover, Basel III strengthens capital
requirements for certain securities, so we increase the weight on ABS from αl to αh. Basel III
also introduces an explicit countercyclical buffer, so that η I I I becomes η I I It , a process that in-
creases in good times and decreases in bad times. Overall, the traditional bank capital must
now respect
capital ≥ η I I It RWA = η
I I I
t α
h(loans+ABS).
If we view the shadow bank as a SIFI, it would also face capital requirements of the form
capital ≥ η I I It RWA = η
I I I
t α
hloans.
Figure 7 summarizes this representation of the Basel III regulation.
Obviously, this stylized framework does not take into account other important dimensions of
the Basel III/DFA, such as capital quality, liquidity, or maturity mismatch.
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Figure 7: Aggregate Balance Sheets under Basel III
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